

THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OTTOMAN-SPANISH RELATIONS IN 1782

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Özet

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve İspanya arasındaki münasebetler daha çok 16.yüzyılda; iki devletin de Akdeniz coğrafyası içinde siyasi egemenlik mücadelesi içine girdikleri dönemde yoğunlaşmış ve zirveye ulaşmıştır. Ancak 16. yüzyılın sonlarından itibaren iki devlet de yeni siyasi rakiplerle karşılaşmış ve karşılıklı olarak mücadeleyi terketmişlerdir. Ancak iki devlet arasında sadece bir ateşkes imzalanmış, resmi bir barış antlaşması imzalanmamıştır. 17. ve 18. yüzyıllar boyunca bu Osmanlı ve İspanya imparatorlukları gitgide güçten düşmüş ve dünya siyasetinde önde gelen konumlarını kaybetmişlerdir. Bu makale 1782 yılında imzalanan Osmanlı-İspanya ahidnamesi ile ilişkilerin yeniden kurulmasını ve iki devlet arasındaki tarihsel benzerlikleri konu almaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı, İspanya, Boulogny, Ahidname.

Abstarct

The political relations between the Ottoman and the Spanish empires around the Mediterranean reached its peak during the 16th century. However, these two great powers were challenged by the new powers and due to this threat they abandon the struggle around the Mediterranean by the end of the 16th century. The Ottomans and the Spanish sign a truce rather than a formal peace. Throughout the 17th and the 18th centuries the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires lost their power as the primary forces in the world politics. This article aims to understand the Ottoman-Spanish Peace Treaty in 1782, and bring a comparative look to the Ottoman-Spanish relations.

Key Words: The Ottoman Empire, Spain, Boulogny, Ahidname.

INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman-Spanish relations can be perceived differently according to the historical conjuncture. For example, we see no direct relations between the Ottomans and the Spanish until the 16th

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century. Although Catalan merchants and corsairs were active in the Mediterranean, they were mostly limited to the western edge of the Mediterranean basin. The 16th century, however, witnessed the rise of empires around the Mediterranean as Braudel emphasized. One of these empires was the Ottomans who controlled the Eastern Mediterranean for the rest of the period of engagement while the other empire was the Habsburgs. In the beginning of my article, I would focus on the Spanish branch of the Habsburg Empire and look into the nature of the relations between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires. Then, I would try to explain the changing positions of the Ottoman and the Spanish and their efforts to keep their status in the 17th century when both of them were challenged by the newly rising powers. In the end, the reasons for the Ottomans to agree on the re-establishment of the Ottoman-Spanish relations in 1782 would form the basis of my article.

In my research, I tried to focus on the documents in the Ottoman archives but I could not reach much countable data on the Ottoman-Spanish relations. That is why, I mainly used the Turkish and English secondary sources. The famous work of Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* probably keeps its status as the best source on the 16th century Mediterranean. I used this monumental work to explain the nature of relations between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires at that period. For the 18th century, there are not enough primary sources except for *İspanya Ahkâm Defteri* in the Ottoman archives. In addition, *Tarih-i Cevdet* by Ahmet Cevdet Paşa is one of my main sources for this period since it includes vast information about the negotiations with the Spanish envoy and it also has copies of some parts of the Ottoman chronicles.

In the academic field, there is much more focus on the Ottoman-Spanish relations in the 16th century, but there is very little research on the 18th. That is the reason why I would try to understand the needs of the Ottoman diplomacy in the late 18th century and reveal the position of the Ottoman-Spanish re-approachment within that framework. In that period, the Ottomans had to deal with the Russian aggression as well as the Austrian hostility. The two shocks forced the Ottomans to re-think their strategies. This first shock was the Battle of Çeşme in 1770 when the Russian fleet, for the first time, entered the Mediterranean and disturbed the Ottoman territories. The second one was the loss of Crimea as a result of the Russian victory. These shocks certainly shaped the direction of the Ottoman diplomacy in the late 18th century. We do not know if there was a major plan to contain the

Russian aggression but we may estimate that the Ottomans did everything to avoid further shocks and disasters.

1. THE OTTOMAN-SPANISH STRUGGLE

1.1. The Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Spain in the 16th Century

The Ottoman-Spanish relations in the 16th century was a reflection of the Ottoman-Habsburg struggle in this age, because prior to this date, we see no direct political and commercial relations between these two powers. Before the unification of Spain under Catholic monarchs Isabella and Fernando in the 15th century, there were largely Catalan commercial and political activity in the Mediterranean. There was a Catalan trade colony in Constantinople which had still been an important commercial center.¹ We know Catalan mercenaries served in Anatolia and in the Balkans under the Byzantine command and sometimes independently.² Catalan corsairs were also active in the Western Mediterranean in the 14th and 15th centuries.³

The Ottoman-Spanish interaction occurred in the beginning of the 16th century when the Habsburg prince Karl was crowned as the King of Spain and became Carlos I in 1516.⁴ Thus, a new enemy occurred in the western Mediterranean. When the Spanish King was re-crowned as the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire as Karl V in 1519⁵, he unified the Mediterranean and European fronts against the Ottoman advance. On the other hand, there was a serious internal problem for the Holy Roman Empire, actually the rise of Protestantism. It was especially effective in the German provinces of the Empire, and made things very difficult for Karl V since he also had to deal with the Ottoman campaigns towards Hungary, and the imperial capital Vienna could again be in danger as it was in 1529. Karl V organized a Spanish counter attack to the Ottoman port at Koron in the Morea in 1532 as a part of a defensive strategy which

¹ Catalans were able to get a district for their trade colony in 1451. See Robert Mantran, *İstanbul Tarihi*, trans. Teoman Tunçdoğan (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 179.

² Mantran, 149.

³ John H. Pryor, *Akdeniz'de Coğrafya, Teknoloji ve Savaş: Araplar, Bizanslılar ve Türkler*, trans. Füsün Tayaç and Tunç Tayaç (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 187.

⁴ Stephen J. Lee, *Avrupa Tarihinden Kesitler 1494-1789*, trans. Ertürk Demirel (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2004), 59.

⁵ Lee, 30.

aimed to distract the Ottoman authorities who were busy with the Hungarian campaign, and were clearly able to threaten Vienna for the second time.⁶ Although the Spanish forces under Andrea D'Oria managed to capture Koron, it was impossible to keep that position which was too far from the logistic centers of the Spanish Empire.⁷

As the Ottoman Empire had technical as well as logistical problems in the Western Mediterranean, the Holy Roman Empire had also difficulties in the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean because of the limitations of the 16th century galley warfare. A year after the capture of Koron by the Spanish, Turkish corsair Barbaros Hayreddin was appointed *Kaptan-i Derya* by Süleyman I, who understood the necessity of forming a significant navy against the Spanish Empire, and Barbaros re-organized the Ottoman fleet in order to increase its operational capability for offensive tactics, especially in the Western Mediterranean. As a result, Koron was recaptured in September 1534 because the Spanish soldiers were starving and they had no hope of getting support. The impossibility of supporting a garrison in Koron was well-known by the Habsburg forces but Karl V was willing to have any moral support which may be provided by this courageous offensive campaign⁸. The field of the Ottoman-Spanish struggle was the Mediterranean as it was also the centre of international relations in the 16th century. The Ottomans had the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and advanced along the Northern Africa where the major land campaigns against the Spanish Empire were fought during the 16th century. The Ottoman admiral Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa's acts most probably were designed to strengthen the Ottoman positions in North Africa.

1.1.1. North Africa

North Africa which had critical importance due to its proximity to the Western Mediterranean and the Spanish ports, was another dimension of the Ottoman-Spanish struggle. The Ottoman naval forces under the command of Barbaros managed to seize Tunis in August 1534, but Karl V could not tolerate the Ottoman control of the Sicilian channel since it would provide a great strategic advantage to the Ottomans.⁹ As a result, Karl V assembled an army of 26.000 men and sailed for Tunis in 1535. Barbaros decided to evacuate Tunis due to the overwhelming enemy forces. On the other

⁶ Özlem Kumrular, "Koron Seferi: Uzak Topraklarda İmkânsız Misyon," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 127 (July 2004), 79.

⁷ Kumrular, 78.

⁸ Kumrular, 78-79.

⁹ Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 72.

hand, in stead of establishing direct Spanish rule over Tunis, Karl V decided to restore Hafşid dynasty under a tributary relationship with Spain.¹⁰ Karl V was determined to sweep away the Ottoman presence in North Africa and in order to achieve this goal he planned to attack the last Ottoman stronghold in the region in 1541. The target was Algeria which had served Muslim corsairs as a safe harbor and became a base for Ottomans who organized attacks to the Spanish coastal towns and ports. The Spanish force was composed of 65 galleys, 450 support ships and 24.000 infantry while Hadim Hasan Ağa, the defender of Algeria, had approximately 6.000 soldiers. However, heavy rain and storm shattered the ships and broke the discipline of the Spanish army. In addition, the Ottoman counterattack forced Karl V to evacuate his army.¹¹ While Karl V focused on the Western Mediterranean defense, Tripoli fell in 1551¹² to the Ottoman forces which were under the command of Sinan Paşa. Karl V was reluctant to resume expensive naval wars against the Ottoman Empire since he had been working against the rising Protestantism among the German princes.¹³

The Ottomans continued to raid the Western Mediterranean ports and towns but there was no Spanish imperial campaign as it was the case in 1535 and 1541. In stead of dealing with the Ottomans in the Mediterranean front, the Habsburg ruler decided to solve the problems with the Protestant German princes who successfully exploited the Ottoman advance deep into Europe in their negotiations with Karl V.¹⁴ The Ottoman Empire closely watched the developments in Europe such as the spread of Protestantism, and the Ottomans tried to coordinate the timing of their campaigns according to the uprisings within the Holy Roman Empire.¹⁵ In 1556, Karl V left Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and Croatia to his brother Ferdinand, the throne of Spain, Flanders and Italian estates were left to his son, Philip, and the reign of Philip II has begun. Between 1556 and 1598 Philip II had to deal with many strategic problems which were: the Ottoman expansion in the Mediterranean region, uprisings in the Low Countries, hostility from England and France. Philip II decided to give priority to the Ottoman

¹⁰ Hess, 73.

¹¹ Hess, 74.

¹² Hess, 75-76.

¹³ Hess, 75.

¹⁴ A. Fisher Galati, *Türk Cihadı ve Alman Protestanlığı, 1551-1555*, trans. Nevâl Öke (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1992), 116-117.

¹⁵ The Ottoman threat played an important role in the official recognition of Protestantism by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. See Galati, 133.

expansion in the Mediterranean since his uncle Ferdinand would deal with the European front.¹⁶

Philip II's naval strategy for the Mediterranean aimed to contain the Ottoman threat in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the peace with the French at Cateau-Cambrésis on April 3, 1559¹⁷, Philip II had a chance to realize his plan. The first target was Gerba near Tripoli for the purpose of containing Ottoman and corsair activities against the Spanish ports. However, the Spanish assault on Gerba was repelled by the Ottoman forces in 1560. After this defeat, Philip II decided to strengthen his naval and land forces for a more effective defensive strategy in the Western Mediterranean.¹⁸ On the other hand, the Ottoman policy was to expand towards the Western Mediterranean and it was necessary to control the central Mediterranean passageways in order to achieve this goal. That is why, the Ottoman admiral Piyale Paşa directed the attack on Malta in 1565. In addition to strengthening the Ottoman position in the central Mediterranean, the Ottoman concerns focused on two points: the first on the elimination of Christian corsairs and secondly on securing the safety of Muslim pilgrims who were going to the Holy lands. While the idea of elimination of the Christian base in this central passageway reflects a strategic sense, the protection of the Muslim pilgrims shows the responsibility of the Ottoman Empire as the major Islamic power in the Mediterranean region. At the end of a long siege, the Ottomans failed to seize Malta and evacuated the island. This event also shows the limits of the 16th century galley warfare because the naval season was from mid-April to beginning of October, and it was very difficult to capture a heavily fortified position like Malta in such a short period with a limited logistic support.¹⁹

The Spanish Empire, on the other hand, was a Christian power and claimed the leadership of the Catholic Christian world. The imperial struggle between the Spanish and the Ottomans had characteristics of the east-west confrontation because these great powers divided the Mediterranean as their field of struggle and dominated the international relations in the 16th century. In 1568 the Moriscos – Hispano-Muslims who had only officially been converted to Christianity, revolted against the Spanish authority because of the policies of Philip II towards the assimilation of the

¹⁶ Lee, 71-72.

¹⁷ Hess, 78.

¹⁸ For the foreign policy of Philip II see Lee, 72.

¹⁹ Hess, 84-85.

Morisco community of the Iberian peninsula.²⁰ The Ottomans did not hesitate to support this uprising through their forces in the North Africa.²¹ The Moriscos may have been expected to serve as *the Ottoman fifth column* in Spain or at least they might be useful for espionage and diversion for other Ottoman operations in the Mediterranean.²² When Philip II had to pull back his troops from Italy under Don Juan de Austria to crush the Morisco rebellion, the Ottoman Empire benefited from this power gap and Tunis, which became a serious obstacle between the Ottoman provinces of Algiers and Tripoli, was seized by the Ottoman forces in 1569.²³ In addition, the main Ottoman fleet sailed for Cyprus in 1570 to secure the flow of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean and to strengthen the Empire's position.²⁴

1.1.2. The Battle of Lepanto

The loss of Cyprus caused a Venetian policy of approach towards the Christian powers like Spain to recover her losses. Pope Pius V also emphasized the Christian unity and call for the formation of the Holy League against the "infidel" Turks. After long and exhausting negotiations, the Holy Alliance was signed by the Papacy, the Spanish Empire and Venice on May 20, 1571.²⁵ Don Juan de Austria was given the supreme command of the allied forces, and financial burden was distributed among the allies according to their strength.²⁶ The Christian fleet was composed of nearly 200 galleys and 6 Venetian galleasses and manpower was formed by Italian, Spanish and German troops. The Christian forces were better equipped in terms of cannons and arquebuses.²⁷ The Christian fleet encountered the Ottoman armada composed of 230 galleys, near the bay of Lepanto on October 7, 1571. The Ottoman fleet was unable to outmaneuver the Christian armada and was forced to have a direct clash in which the Christians had the advantage. The result of this battle was the total destruction of the Ottoman naval forces except

²⁰ Philip II sought to assimilate the Moriscos in Spain by changing their customs and clothing. See Andrew C. Hess "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain," *The American Historical Review*, vol. 74, no. 1 (October, 1968), 5.

²¹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 88-89 and "Moriscos", 15.

²² Hess, "Moriscos", 5-6, 23-24.

²³ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 89.

²⁴ Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, trans. Nilüfer Epçeli, ed. Kemal Beydilli, vol. III (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), 127.

²⁵ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Sian Reynolds, vol. II (London: Fontana/Collins, 1976), 1089.

²⁶ Braudel, 1090.

²⁷ Braudel, 1102.

for the 30 galleys under Uluç Ali Paşa who managed to escape through the Christian flanks.²⁸

After the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto, Don Juan de Austria invaded Tunis in 1573, and a new fortress was built at La Goletta, which was garrisoned with the Spanish soldiers, in order to create deterrence for a future Ottoman assault.²⁹ Although the battle of Lepanto was a serious military defeat for the Ottomans, it could not be exploited by the Holy League and they could not turn it into a strategic success, thus the Holy League collapsed. On the other hand, the Ottomans successfully built a new armada the next year thanks to their enormous resources. The battle of Lepanto marked an era which shows the end of the Mediterranean-oriented world politics and the beginning of an Atlantic-oriented one instead since both the Ottoman and Spanish Empires had tendencies to leave the struggle. Although the Mediterranean did not lose its importance immediately, it started to decline even though it kept its characteristics as a major field of struggle between the East and the West. The most important effect of Lepanto however was a psychological one, because it ended the myth of the Ottoman supremacy in the Mediterranean.

Despite of the initial military consequences of Lepanto, the battle itself was far from damaging Ottoman position in the Mediterranean. The Ottomans not only defended their positions, but they also launched a series of counterattacks in order to restore their damaged prestige and self-respect. First of all, the Ottomans achieved the re-building of the armada under the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmet Paşa, and by the help of this military force, they continued their expansion into North Africa. Secondly, the Pope Pius V who was the spiritual leader of the Christian alliance, died in 1572³⁰ and the Venetians left the Holy League and made a separate peace agreement on March 7, 1573 with the Ottomans in order to protect their commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and normalize³¹ their relations with the Ottomans.³² For the Spanish side of the struggle, the Ottomans made their preparations to hit the

²⁸ John F. Guilmartin, "The Tactics of the Battle of Lepanto Clarified: The Impact of Social, Economic, and Political Factors on Sixteenth Century Galley Warfare," *New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers at the Fourth Naval History Symposium, United States Naval Academy 25-26 October 1979*, edited by Craig I. Symonds (Annapolis, Maryland: the United States Naval Institute, 1981), 10 and Jorga, 137.

²⁹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 93.

³⁰ Braudel, 1115.

³¹ Venetians mostly depended on the Ottoman grain in order to feed their cities, and the expenses of war were forcing the limits of this wealthy state which lives on her commercial lifelines. See Braudel, 1125, and Jorga, 140.

³² Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 92, also see Braudel, 1137.

Spanish forces at Tunis which was chosen as the target of the Ottoman counterattack. The Ottoman armada sailed under the admiral Sinan Paşa and reached Tunis in 1574. On August 24, Sinan Paşa managed to capture the fortified Spanish position of La Goletta and the remaining Spanish forces in Tunis surrendered on September 13, when they lost their hope of getting any support from the Spanish Empire.³³

Although the Ottoman Empire was having difficulties in finding enough number of experienced sailors and oarsmen for the navy, it was still a fearful enemy in terms of material power and their production capacity in their shipyards. The naval and overseas campaigns became too expensive with the developments in the tactics and the military technology. Thus the Spanish Empire was not willing to continue her engagement with the Ottomans in the Mediterranean in which there was a limited gain from costly naval battles and overseas assaults. This is the reason why Spain turned its attention to the Atlantic Ocean and Anglo-Spanish competition and concentrated its power to crush the Dutch uprising which had been a troublesome issue.³⁴

Towards the end of the 16th century while the Spanish Empire was dealing with England and the Dutch revolts, the Ottoman Empire directed its power to the Safavid Iran which was becoming a political threat as well as an ideological one in the east. Another rival was the rising northern power, Russia, which had already captured Kazan in 1552 and had particularly antagonistic designs towards the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Ottoman and Spanish Empires left the struggle for the Mediterranean and directed their limited resources and military powers to more critical issues in their imperial agendas. In the end, the Ottoman and Spanish Empires had lost their primary interest towards one another. Although there was an initiative to sign a peace treaty by the Spanish Empire, it was concluded as a truce rather than an official peace in 1578.³⁵

1.2. Changing Positions in the 17th and 18th Centuries

The Ottoman and Spanish Empires witnessed a change in conjuncture throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. In this period, the positions of the Ottoman and Spanish Empires were seriously

³³ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier*, 95.

³⁴ Braudel, 1142, 1185.

³⁵ Don Giovanni Marigliano was sent by Philip II as the envoy to sign the peace treaty with the Ottomans. See Kemal Beydilli, "İspanya," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 23 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınevi, 2001), 165.

challenged by the newly rising powers such as England, France and Russia. As a result they had lost their status as great powers and as primary actors of once, and therefore were reduced to the secondary rank in terms of economic and political power. The Ottoman and Spanish powers were not reluctant to accept this new status quo and therefore they resisted this change by different means. These both states were forced to transform their financial and political institutions due to the changing positions. The Ottomans along with the other Mediterranean states saw a gradual decline of the Mediterranean as a political arena after the 16th century.³⁶ The Spanish, on the other hand, encountered with the new imperial as well as commercial rivals such as England, France and Dutch which challenged her maritime empire and her commercial and colonial relations with America.³⁷ In this time, the North Atlantic gradually replaced the Mediterranean as the centre of the world commerce and the source of political struggle. As a result of this change, we see no major encounter between the Ottomans and the Spanish which had lost their primary interest for one another as there was a limited gain from a bloody struggle. That is why, the Spanish Empire focused on the maintenance of her dominant position in the continent and the rise of Protestantism while the Ottomans had to deal with the rising Russia and the Safavid Iran in their eastern front and then the Habsburg Austria in order to protect the status quo in which the Ottoman Empire was still a primary actor.

1.2.1. The Spanish Position

The Spanish power in the Atlantic and Europe as the dominant power was challenged by England under Queen Elizabeth I while the Protestant uprisings in the Netherlands caused a serious problem for the Catholic Spain.³⁸ These political and ideological problems continued to create an immense burden on the Spanish treasure in the 17th century. The maintenance of the Spanish overseas empire and protection of her colonies was a costly job. In addition to the imperial struggle with England, Spain had to deal with the Protestant rebels who were supported by England in the Netherlands where the expenses of the Spanish army became too high. Spain however was not able to cover these increasing expenses as it was the case in the 16th century due to the failure of mobilizing her man-power and material sources.³⁹ From the financial point of

³⁶ Braudel, 1186.

³⁷ Beydilli, "İspanya", 164.

³⁸ Lee, 73-76.

³⁹ John H. Elliott, "The Decline of Spain," *Past and Present*, No. 20 (November, 1961), 56.

view, the flow of gold and silver from America and taxes on Italian trade were unable to fulfill the needs of the Spanish Empire while the crown of Castile remained as the most reliable estate since it was ruled and taxed directly.⁴⁰ In addition to the man-power that can be gathered in Castile, an important tax-income can be provided for the imperial purposes of Spain. Castile was able to offer these resources for the empire in the 16th century but it became increasingly difficult to meet this endless demands for man and gold in the 17th century.⁴¹ As a result, we may see that most of the problems of Spain were caused by the over-expansion and prolonged armed conflicts which exhausted the Spanish treasure.

As a response to the increasing military expenses Spain decided to settle its disputes with her rivals. The Mediterranean front was closed when a truce was signed with the Ottomans in 1578⁴². This respite was strengthened by other treaties, namely the Franco-Spanish treaty of Vervins in 1598⁴³, the Anglo-Spanish treaty of London in 1604 and a truce with the Dutch were signed in 1609.⁴⁴ Spain may have sought peace to restore its power and maintain its large empire in a century in which she had faced challenges.⁴⁵ In order to deal with the increasing economic problems the Spanish statesmen tried to offer solutions. According to them, royal expenditures had to be controlled, the tax system had to be reformed, and some measures for irrigation and agricultural development had to be taken.⁴⁶ The technological backwardness may be put forward for economic problems of Spain because she failed to compete with the technological advance of the Western Europe.⁴⁷

1.2.2 The Ottoman Position

The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, had no direct signs of decline as an economic and political power in the 17th century. However, the changing conjuncture forced the Ottomans to transform their imperial policies and adopt themselves. The Ottomans fought to keep their role as the primary force that

⁴⁰ Paul Kennedy, *Büyük Güçlerin Yükseliş ve Çöküşleri: 16. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Ekonomik Değişim ve Askeri Çatışmalar*, trans. Birtane Karanakaç (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2005), 72-73.

⁴¹ Elliott, 57-60.

⁴² Beydilli, "İspanya", 165.

⁴³ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. III, part II (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1977), 121.

⁴⁴ Beydilli, "İspanya", 164.

⁴⁵ Paul C. Allen, *Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621, The Failure of Grand Strategy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 2.

⁴⁶ Elliott, 65.

⁴⁷ Elliott, 67.

determine the developments in the international arena but due to the decline of the Mediterranean as a field of struggle between the Muslim and the Christian worlds and the rise of the Atlantic, this job was increasingly difficult. The Zitvotorok Treaty in 1606 showed the fact that the Ottoman Empire was now "negotiating" peace with her enemies in equal conditions.⁴⁸ The Ottomans managed to protect the status quo in the European front and even expanded their empire into Ukraine in the 17th century.⁴⁹ However, the Ottoman power was challenged by the European powers at the end of the 17th century when the Ottoman forces besieged Vienna and caused the formation of the Holy Alliance against the Ottoman Empire. After the second siege of Vienna and its aftermath of the Holy League (1683-1699) which resulted in the Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottoman inability to defeat an overwhelmingly better organized enemy force became clear.⁵⁰ Although, the treaty of Karlowitz is strongly emphasized by some historians as a turning point and as the beginning of the Ottoman decline, it may not be an actual fact because the Ottomans were able to fight and support their armies against the forces of the Holy Alliance on a vast front stretching from the Morean peninsula to the Ukraine, and they were able to provide logistic needs of her armies during this 16 years of prolonged conflict which is a significant sign of the might of the Ottoman economy and its ability to adopt itself to the extreme conditions. Although there were no clear signs of deterioration in the Ottoman military and economic institutions, the natural limits for the Ottoman advance was reached and the Ottomans lost their interest for further advance deep into Europe.⁵¹

According to the latest works in this field, the Ottoman Empire was able to maintain her status as a major world power and succeeded in transforming herself to meet the demands of the changing conjuncture in the 16th and 17th centuries.⁵² For example, the Ottomans used capitulations in order to protect the commercial activities in the Mediterranean, and they were able to attract even the oceanic trade ships into this commercial line.⁵³ The military scene had always the first impact on the statesmen and it was not different in the Ottoman Empire. After the defeats in the end of War of the Holy League in which the Ottoman Empire also had her

⁴⁸ Jorga, vol. III, 285, 286.

⁴⁹ Jorga, vol. IV, 127-141.

⁵⁰ Rhodes Murphey, *Osmanlı'da Ordu ve Savaş, 1500-1700*, trans. M. Tanju Akad (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2007), 33.

⁵¹ Murphey, 32-34.

⁵² Murphey, 211-218.

⁵³ Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Türk İktisat Tarihi* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2003), 252.

successes, nevertheless they felt a strong need to re-organize their army and to improve their logistical system, but the most important effect of the war was its incredible financial burden on the Ottoman budget. By the 17th and 18th centuries, wars were becoming increasingly expensive and difficult to be financed by the middle-size states. Although there were significant limitations on the mobilization of the Ottoman forces, the Ottomans managed to finance the long and devastating wars due to their well-based bureaucracy and strong financial institutions.⁵⁴

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman and the Spanish politics were reduced to the secondary status in the international arena. Although the Ottomans and the Spanish showed a great effort to protect their status as major political powers, they witnessed the rise of the Atlantic powers such as England and France. In the beginning of the 18th century, War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) ended the Spanish position as the primary force that dominated the European politics.⁵⁵ The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, had lost its status of an expanding actor at the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.⁵⁶ Although the Ottomans managed to recover some of its losses, it was no longer the primary actor in the international arena. The primary stands of the Ottoman and Spanish Empires in the 16th century passed to England and France whose imperial and commercial struggle would dominate the international relations in the 18th century due to their increasing ability to control vast economies with overseas colonies.

2. THE OTTOMAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LATE 18th CENTURY

During the second half of the 18th century, the most important threat for the Ottomans was the rising Russian Empire. The Russians aimed to expand toward the south in the Black Sea region. In addition, Russia started its modernization during the reign of Peter the Great and since then the war was an impulse for their reforms. That is why the Ottomans had to deal with a rising force which had enormous resources. The Ottoman army, due to the superior organization and logistics, was able to prevent any Russian attack towards the Ottoman lands in the 16th and 17th centuries, but during the 1683-1699 Wars, Russia joined the Holy Alliance in 1686

⁵⁴ The Ottomans faced serious challenges when they mobilize their forces, but they were able to overcome most of their problems due to their well-managed bureaucracy. See Murphey, 35-57.

⁵⁵ Spain had to turn over some of her holdings to Austria, and Britain acquired from Spain Gibraltar and the island of Minorca in the Mediterranean. See Beydilli, "İspanya", 164.

⁵⁶ Jorga, vol. IV, 231.

and as result of this combined force they managed to capture the Azak which had critical importance due to the its location. However, the Ottomans defeated the Russian army led by Peter the Great in 1711. As a result of this Ottoman victory, the Azak was taken back and the Russian advance was halted for half a century. These events were the first signs of the future warfare with the Russians throughout the 18th century.⁵⁷

In addition to the southern route the Russian Empire was also aiming to advance towards the Baltic Sea on the North, the czars of Russia followed the traditional foreign policy imposed by the Peter the Great. The southern route of the Russian advance had confronted with the Ottoman resistance while the Russians faced Swedish opposition at the North. During the Ottoman-Russian War (1768-1774) the Russian Baltic fleet advanced through the North Sea and entered the Mediterranean through the strait of Gibraltar. The aim of the Russian fleet was to provoke the Greek population of the Ottomans and to search and destroy the Ottoman naval force and they did succeed at Çeşme where the Ottoman fleet was finally destroyed in 1770⁵⁸. This event created the first shock at the Ottoman capital because it was the first major act of the Russians in the Mediterranean and the Ottomans could not tolerate a second one. This purpose would shape the Ottoman foreign policy in the late 18th century. The second shock came when Crimea became independent as a result of the Ottoman defeat and the Treaty of the Küçük Kaynarca with the Russians in 1774.⁵⁹ The loss of vast Muslim population caused the demoralization of the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁰ The Ottoman position was weakened due to the long and devastating wars, and she was not able to stand against the rising Russia alone. This meant that they needed to find allies through diplomacy. The Ottomans were now in search of new allies to balance the increasing Russian power and the hostile coalition of Russia and Austria.⁶¹

In addition to their organizational problems, the Ottomans suffered from over-extension. There were three major fronts that the

⁵⁷ Svetlana Oreshkova, "Rus-Osmanlı Savaşları: Sebepler ve Bazı Tarihi Sonuçlar," in *Osmanlı*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999), 557.

⁵⁸ İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4, part I (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1978), 400.

⁵⁹ Hasan Şahin, "Kaynarca'dan (1774) Paris Barışı'na (1856) Kadar Şark Meselesi Perspektifinde Osmanlı-Rus Münasebetlerine Genel Bir Bakış," in *Türkler*, vol. 12 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 531-532.

⁶⁰ Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, "1774-1789 Yıllarında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Dış Politikası," in *Türkler*, vol. 12 (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 546.

⁶¹ Sarıcaoğlu, 550.

Ottomans were dealing with, namely the Black Sea, the southern Europe and the Mediterranean. As a result, the Ottomans needed to follow an intense diplomacy to overcome their strategic problems. When the Ottoman Empire abandoned its policy of unilateral act, she decided to find reliable allies through intense diplomacy in order to defeat her better organized enemies.⁶² The first choice for alliance was Sweden which had confronted with the Russian aggression at the Baltic Sea. She was eager to cooperate against this common enemy. The Ottomans and Swedish were the targets of the traditional Russian policy which aimed to expand into the warm waters. That is why, both of them saw Russia as a major threat to their integrity. The first treaty of alliance with Sweden had been signed in 1740⁶³ and a second one could respond the Ottoman needs in the late 18th century, thus the second treaty of alliance with Sweden was signed in 1789⁶⁴. There were mainly two expectations; the first was to deter Russia by creating a joint front which depends on Ottoman sources, still impressive, and the Swedish military intelligence. The second reason was to prevent the Russian Baltic fleet from accessing the Mediterranean. Sweden could control the Baltic fleet of the Russian Empire if they could manage to control the Strait of Sund.

In southern Europe, a strong continental power to check the Russians as well as Austrians, was needed. Prussia was one of the major European powers which could respond the Ottoman needs. A long process of negotiation resulted in the treaty of alliance with Prussia which was signed in 1790,⁶⁵ against both the Austrian aggression in Southern Europe and against the Russian threat at the North. The treaty of alliance with Prussia was especially in favor of the Ottomans, because it provided Prussian support against the Russians and Austrians which was an extraordinary diplomatic success.⁶⁶ In the Mediterranean front, the need to control the entrance of the Mediterranean, in the end, motivated the Ottomans to welcome the Spanish envoy.

2.1. The Re-Establishment of Ottoman-Spanish Relations

In the second half of the 18th century, the Bourbon monarch Carlos III, the former King of the Two Sicilies, became the king of Spain. When he was the king of the Two Sicilies, he had initiated the normalization of the Ottoman-Sicilian relations, and that is why he

⁶² Uzunçarşılı, IV, I, 247.

⁶³ Uzunçarşılı, 294.

⁶⁴ Uzunçarşılı, 543-546.

⁶⁵ Kemal Beydilli, *1790 Osmanlı-Prusya İttifakı: Meydana Gelişi, Tahlili, Tatbiki* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1984), 67-70, Uzunçarşılı, 559.

⁶⁶ Beydilli, 67-70.

signed the Treaty of Trade and Friendship with the Ottomans in 1740.⁶⁷ Since the Two Sicilies was a relatively small state, Ottomans did not hesitate to grant them capitulatory rights because there was not any political expectation for the Ottomans from such a state. Carlos III, when he became the king of Spain due to his Bourbon ties, wished to normalize the Ottoman-Spanish relations during the reign of Mustafa II but Sadrazam Koca Ragıp Paşa who was responsible for the talks, died during the negotiations in 1763, and thus negotiations ended.⁶⁸ Carlos III resumed his efforts in 1779 and sent his envoy Don Juan de Bouligny, a leading merchant⁶⁹, to the Sublime Porte to establish political and economic relations with the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁰ The Spanish Empire could clearly benefit from the direct commercial relations with the Ottomans. However, the main concern of Spain was to prevent the attacks of the *gazis* who were based in North Africa through the support of the Ottoman authorities. The *gazis* were causing serious damage on the flow of Spanish commercial activities and they also could conduct organized raids against the Spanish ports.

2.2 The Negotiations

Although the Ottoman concerns were much different than the ones held by the Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Bouligny, they decided to start talks to further understand the position of Spain and to search for benefits that could be exploited. However, the Ottomans neither accepted nor rejected the Spanish offers because normalization of relations was not an immediate concern for them. On the other hand, they could not tolerate to alienate Spain especially after the recent Russian activities in the Mediterranean.

The Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Bouligny wanted that the Treaty of Trade and Friendship signed with the Two Sicilies in 1740, to be the basis for the Ottoman-Spanish Treaty of Peace and Trade.⁷¹ The Ottomans who could not simply say "no" to the Spanish envoy, followed a policy of slowing the talks down. The Ottomans argued that Spain is not equal to the Two Sicilies in terms of political and economic power, and as a result, a similar treaty simply could not be granted as it was the case in 1740. The Ottoman Empire was not willing to accept the Spanish terms without taking something in

⁶⁷ Uzunçarşılı, IV, II, 240.

⁶⁸ Ahmet Cevdet, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. II (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1891), 184.

⁶⁹ Don Juan de Bouligny was a quite remarkable character. He engaged in the efforts to establish a National Bank and worked on the plans to improve the national economy of Spain. See Earl J. Hamilton, "Plans for a National Bank in Spain, 1701-1783," *The Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 57, no.4 (August, 1949), 326.

⁷⁰ Uzunçarşılı, IV, II, 242.

⁷¹ Cevdet, II, 184.

return. The Ottomans hoped that they could convince Spain for a political treaty or even military cooperation against the Russian Empire which became a serious threat for the Mediterranean since 1770. In 1779 Reisü'l-Küttab Abdürrezzak Efendi, the Ottoman official responsible for the talks, showed the Ottoman demands as the closing of the Strait of Gibraltar⁷² in the case of an enemy act against the Ottomans and secondly, as the release of Muslim prisoners who were held in Spain. Boulogny stated that Spain could not control the Strait of Gibraltar due to the lack of power.⁷³

Meanwhile Halil Hamid Efendi became Reisü'l-Küttab. Boulogny, after consulting to his capital, informed the Ottomans that the issue of Muslim prisoners can be handled by sending them to İstanbul.⁷⁴ In August of 1779, the Ottoman statesmen who gathered to discuss the critical situation in Crimea, also discussed the talks with the Spanish envoy.⁷⁵ The discussion on what the Ottoman position should be, was inconclusive and as a result, they decided to ask the opinion of the Sadrazam who was not present in this meeting.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, the Spanish Empire declared war on the British which engaged warfare with the Bourbon France because of colonies in America, and surrounded their forces in the Gibraltar. Although Boulogny tried to offer some terms on the besieged Gibraltar in return of the prevention of attacks of North African gazis, this event did not create an immediate expectation for the Ottomans because the success of the Spanish attack was not imminent.⁷⁷

The Ottomans who were not really very eager to sign a commercial treaty with the Spanish, decided to get rid of Boulogny by bringing forward some obstacles which were not related to the Spanish.⁷⁸ The Ottomans thought that they succeeded when they heard no news from Boulogny for a while but 7-8 months later, in September 1780, the ambassador of the Two Sicilies informed the Sublime Port that Boulogny did not leave for Spain and he was still in İstanbul. He also added that he was charged to assist the negotiations.⁷⁹ After a while Boulogny reappeared with two issues. The first one was the question on the position of ships. *"How should*

⁷² The Strait of Gibraltar is referred as the Strait of Septe in the Ottoman documents as well as in *Tarih-i Cevdet*. However I would use the common name, Gibraltar.

⁷³ Cevdet, II, 184-185.

⁷⁴ Cevdet, II, 185.

⁷⁵ Beydilli, "*İspanya*", 166.

⁷⁶ Cevdet, II, 185.

⁷⁷ Beydilli, "*İspanya*", 166.

⁷⁸ Cevdet, II, 185-186.

⁷⁹ Beydilli, "*İspanya*", 166.

the Ottoman and Spanish vessels act when they encounter? Should they act hostile or friendly?" Another issue was the question of the Spanish relations with the North African gazis. The Spanish Empire wished to make peace with them. *"Could the Ottomans issue an order to motivate them for peace with the Spanish?"* The Ottomans stated that these issues were related to the Kaptan Paşa, the grand admiral, so they should wait his return.⁸⁰ As a result of the second attempt of Bouligny to advance in the talks failed, the Ottoman tactics of slowing down continued with success.

When Süleyman Fevzi Efendi became Reisü'l-Küttab, Bouligny gave two more proposals to the Ottoman government. The first one was a demand for an imperial order (*ferman*) that previously had asked for the North African gazis to be motivated for peace with Spain. The second one was the demand of the extension of the Treaty of the Two Sicilies so that it would include the Spanish Empire within the framework of friendly relations.⁸¹ On the other hand, the Ottoman side insisted on a political cooperation between the Ottomans and the Spanish. After the evaluation of the Spanish demands and views of the Ottoman statesmen, Sultan Abdülhamid I ordered to start the weekly negotiations for the Ottoman-Spanish treaty in 1781. The Swedish King ordered his chargé d'affaires in İstanbul to support the negotiations of the Spanish envoy with the Ottomans. The Swedish chargé d'affaires argued accordingly that Spain should be held in the anti-Russian camp. Reisü'l-Küttab Süleyman Fevzi Efendi, Beylikçi Hayri Efendi, the Spanish envoy Don Juan de Bouligny, his translator and the Swedish dragoman, Ignatius D'Ohsson attended the meetings.⁸²

Süleyman Fevzi Efendi argued that they needed a basis for the treaty, Bouligny suggested that the Treaty of the Two Sicilies to be a basis. However Süleyman Fevzi Efendi opposed that idea by arguing that time and place had changed so they needed to have a political benefit from such a treaty.⁸³ The Ottoman side worked on a political treaty a long with the Treaty of Friendship and Trade. They wanted to have a written confirmation of the friendship of the Spanish Empire, so the Ottomans wished to have a political document. Bouligny who was exhausted because of the Ottoman tactics of diplomacy, finally erupted: *"I have been here for three years, I spent one year in roads, why do not you give me a positive or*

⁸⁰ Cevdet, II, 186-187.

⁸¹ Cevdet, II, 187-188.

⁸² Cevdet, II, 188-189, Beydilli, "*İspanya*", 167.

⁸³ Cevdet, II, 190.

negative answer?" The Ottoman response was even more depressing: *"these businesses can not be handled with haste."*⁸⁴

In the second meeting, Don Juan de Bouligny insisted on an answer to the Spanish terms, and Süleyman Fevzi Efendi said that other articles can be determined once the basis was decided on. Bouligny repeated that they could be sure of the friendship and neutrality of Spain but added that he was not authorized to sign anything except the terms of the Treaty of Trade and Friendship that was signed with the Two Sicilies. The Ottoman side responded that the gesture of good will is not enough in inter-state relations, they needed to be written down.⁸⁵ In the third meeting, Bouligny stated that Spain needed something in return for the principle of neutrality, and the title of *Padişah* should be given to the Spanish King as it was given to the French King. Süleyman Fevzi Efendi said that this title was given to the French King after a long period of friendship and alliances. As a result, Spain could not expect anything in return of not helping enemies of the Ottoman Empire because it had already been so.⁸⁶

The rest of the articles, like the release of Muslim prisoners, the issue of an imperial order for North African gazis for peace with Spain, and the prevention of the attacks of Christian corsairs to the Ottoman subjects, were nearly complete.⁸⁷ When most of the terms were agreed upon, the Spanish envoy Bouligny stated that the Ottoman Empire should not help enemies of the Spanish Empire. This was also a critical issue because the status of North African gazis were not clear. Despite of their independent acts, they were subjects of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the term *"enemy"* was replaced by *"Christian"* and determined as the *"state of war with the Christian states"* because according to the Islamic law, the Ottoman Empire as the major Islamic state was obliged to help Muslim states who asked for any type of support.⁸⁸

Bouligny was still insisting on an imperial order for North African gazis on the assumption that they were already willing to make peace with Spain. On the other hand, Kaptan Paşa investigated the issue and informed Süleyman Fevzi Efendi. According to him, North African gazis were still fighting with Spain and they even recently had captured a number of Spanish ships, and they had no wish to make peace with Spain since they make their living by these

⁸⁴ Cevdet, II, 190-191.

⁸⁵ Cevdet, II, 191-192.

⁸⁶ Cevdet, II, 192-193.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Cevdet, II, 193.

corsair acts.⁸⁹ Boulogny said that he was again noticed by his capital that he should strictly stay within the framework of the terms of the Treaty of Trade and Friendship that was signed with the Two Sicilies. Thereupon the Ottoman translator of the Divan-i Hümayun met Boulogny and tried to convince him to stay until the treaty was signed. However, Boulogny complained about the delay and the Ottoman tricks. He even threatened the Ottomans that if this treaty would not be signed, the whole Bourbon family, France, Spain and the Two Sicilies would give up their friendship with the Ottomans. On the other hand, the Ottoman side could not afford to cut off the negotiations because Austria and Russia were suspected to be in an alliance against the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Ottomans informed Boulogny that most of the terms were agreed on and that there were just few details that had to be decided. Thus, if he wished to give up, it would be his responsibility.⁹⁰

Hayri Efendi became Reisü'l-Küttab and proceeded with the negotiations in 1782. He visited Kaptan Paşa in order to have an idea on the North African gazis and the Muslim prisoners. Kaptan Paşa explained him that North African gazis should not be forced to make peace with Spain, in stead of that, they may have their own right to decide on their relations with Spain. According to Kaptan Paşa the exchange of prisoners was impossible since prisoners who were used in the navy and the shipyards were completely Spanish and if the Ottomans returned them, they could not be replaced. On the other hand, Spain had only 150, at most 200 Muslim prisoners, according to the intelligence. North African gazis could pay their ransom.⁹¹ Meanwhile the Swedish chargé d' affaires also tried to motivate Hayri Efendi to conclude the negotiations positively, and he informed Hayri Efendi that if the Ottoman Empire rejected the Spanish offer of peace, Spain might turn to the Russian lines which was undesirable for both, the Ottomans and the Swedish.⁹² After the negotiations and the contributions of the Swedish chargé d' affaires, the Ottomans decided on five principles of neutrality which were supposed to be the basis of the Ottoman-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Trade.

First of all, the Ottoman Empire would not help the Christian enemies of the Spanish Empire and would remain neutral. The Muslim states were not included into this principle of neutrality. The Spanish Empire would not help enemies of the Ottoman Empire except for France and the Two Sicilies, and would remain neutral.

⁸⁹ Cevdet, II, 193-194.

⁹⁰ Cevdet, II, 194-195.

⁹¹ Cevdet, II, 197-198.

⁹² Cevdet, II, 198-199.

Secondly, this treaty of friendship between the Ottoman and the Spanish would be announced to North African gazis, and inform them that peace is desired. An imperial order would be issued if necessary. Thirdly, the article on prisoners would be handled according to the Treaty of Trade and Friendship that was signed with the Two Sicilies. Fourthly, the Spanish Empire would try to prevent attacks of the Christian corsairs from Malta and Genoa. And lastly, any article which is beneficial to both, the Ottomans and the Spanish could be added to this treaty.⁹³

The Ottoman Empire gave these articles to the Spanish envoy Boulogny to be sent to Madrid and they waited for approval. At the end, the Spanish King Don Carlos III approved these articles and ordered Boulogny to conclude the treaty within thirty days. After the negotiations which the Swedish mission had widely supported and encouraged, and as a result of Boulogny's correspondence with Madrid, the sides agreed upon the terms of a capitulation (Treaty of Friendship and Trade) and a Treaty of Neutrality on September 14, 1782.⁹⁴ The ratification process of the treaties was completed in 1784⁹⁵. This treaty was composed of twenty-one articles and a conclusion.

2.3. The Treaty of Trade and Friendship in 1782

According to the Treaty of Trade and Friendship⁹⁶, 1- The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires agreed on the friendly relations and signed peace. Thus trade is allowed between the subjects of

⁹³ Cevdet, II, 200-201.

⁹⁴ "... En Constantinopla a 14 Septiembre de 1782." See Articulos De Paz y Comercio Ajustados Con La Puerta Otomana en Constaninopla a 14 de septiembre de 1782 por el ministro plenipotenciario de S.M. el Sr. D.Juan de Boulogny y el de la misma Puerta El Haggi Seid Muhamed Baxa, gran visir. En virtud de los plenos poderes que se comunicaron y canjearon reciprocamente cuyos articulos fueron ratificados por el Rey Nuestro Senor en 24 de diciembre se 1782 y por la Puerta en 24 de Abril de 1783 y sus ratificaciones canjeadas en Constantinopla el mismo dia 24 de abril, habiendo llegado a Madrid de la Puerta en noviembre del propio ano. (Madrid, Imprenta Real, 1783) 23. (the Spanish version of the 1782 Treaty. I was given by the Institute of Cervantes on February 1, 2007.)

⁹⁵ Beydilli, "İspanya", 167.

⁹⁶ The text of the treaty was taken from Tarih-i Cevdet, but I compared it with the Spanish version that I received form the Institute of Cervantes on February 1, 2007: Articulos De Paz y Comercio Ajustados Con La Puerta Otomana. I thank valueble director of the Institute of Cervantes, Pablo Martin Asuero for translation. I here give an overview of the treaty, the full text can be found in *Tarih-i Cevdet*. See Cevdet, II, 338-343.

these two powers. 2- The custom rates are fixed at %3 within the framework of friendly relations. 3- The Spanish Empire is allowed to have her representatives in the Ottoman territories and ports. They would be treated like the representatives and translators of other friendly powers.⁹⁷ 4- Free passage of the subjects of the King of Spain in the Ottoman territories including the Holy Places is granted. The article sets rules to ensure that the inheritances of deceased Spanish subjects will not be confiscated by the Ottoman authorities but returned to the Spanish consulates. The same rules are set for the Ottomans in the Spanish territories.⁹⁸ 5- The Spanish consuls or their translators would be allowed to attend in the trade courts related to commercial dealings. The same right is granted for the Ottomans in the Spanish territories. 6- The Ottoman Empire will not arrest any Spanish without a cause. And if there is a cause, they will inform the Spanish consulates. 7- The Ottoman subjects and merchants are free to make trade in the Spanish territories. An Ottoman consulate will be established in *Alicante*⁹⁹ to deal with any possible problems affecting them. 8- The Ottoman authorities will help the Spanish vessels in their waters if damaged in storm. 9- The sides will not disturb their military vessels. 10- This article regulates the quarantine issues. 11- This article deals with the method of salutation when the Ottoman and the Spanish vessels encounter. In critical situation, they would help each other. 12- The subjects of the Spanish Empire would only convert to Islam in the presence of the Spanish consulates. 13- This article guarantees the lives and properties and their safe return in case of piracy. 14- This article determines the good treatment to the prisoners and their return in exchange of ransom. 15- This article deals with the smuggling and sets the punishments. 16- The Spanish and the Ottoman Empires would not let the enemy powers to chase the vessels of any sides in their waters. 17- The Ottoman Empire would inform the gazis in

⁹⁷ Especially after the ratification of treaty the Spanish consulates started to open in mostly eastern Mediterranean shores like Lebanon. See The document on the establishment of the Spanish consulate in Lebanon, İspanya Ahkam Defteri, A.DVNS.DVE.d 047/2-0001.

⁹⁸ The right to travel of the Spanish subjects is accepted, but the terminology which is used in the texts is quite different. For example Cevdet mentions "seyyah/traveler" while the spanish document uses the word of pilgrimage; "... en la exercio de la Religion, y en la peregrinacion de Jerusalem..." See Articulos De Paz y Comercio Ajustados Con La Otomana, 7. To compare also see Cevdet, II, 338-339.

⁹⁹ The word Alicante is not clear in *Tarih-i Cevdet*, but I check the spanish version to be sure; ... que resida en la Ciudad de Alicante... See Articulos De Paz y Comercio Ajustados Con La Puerta Otomana, 11. To compare also see Cevdet, II, 339.

North Africa that their peace with Spain is desired.¹⁰⁰ 18- There would be no production of warships for the enemies of the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires in their shipyards. Authorities in the Ottoman and Spanish ports will not allow the enemy sneak attacks to friendly vessels. 19- This article regulates the customs for the consulates and the free trade policies except the strategic materials like gunpowder and cannons. 20- The Ottoman and Spanish currencies will be valid in the commercial activities. No extra tax will be issued. 21- No extra taxes would be demanded by the Ottoman government from the subjects of the Spanish Empires. If necessary, any additional tax would be negotiated.¹⁰¹

2.4. The Spanish Mission

After the re-establishment of the relations between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires, Don Juan de Boulogne became the first permanent representative of the King of Spain at the Ottoman court. First of all, the Boulogne family had an interesting story. They were three brothers; Jose, Juan and Francisco. They engaged in slave trade in the late 18th century. They were the sons of Juan Boulogne from Marseille and Maria Paret from Alicante. Jose had been unsuccessful in his commercial activities, Francisco was an officer and became the governor of Luisiana, and lastly Juan was sent to İstanbul.¹⁰² He had to deal with the establishment of the embassy and the problem of translation. Boulogne also started to work on the reports about the general status of the Ottoman Empire as a part of his mission.¹⁰³ Boulogne soon understood the necessity of dragomans to carry out the relations with the Sublime Port. However, there was no trained Spanish translator, and that is why Boulogne had to make use of non-Muslim Ottomans and the Italians.¹⁰⁴ As a result of this situation Boulogne proposed to his king to establish a "School of Language" for the Spanish boys. He also emphasized that if this school was established in İstanbul, boys would also learn the Turkish culture and traditions along with the language.¹⁰⁵ In 1784, a small Spanish fleet under the command of

¹⁰⁰ This article regulates the original aim of the Spanish peace initiative, the elimination of corsair threat. See *Articulos De Paz y Comercio Ajustados Con La Puerta Otomana*, 17-18.

¹⁰¹ Cevdet, 338-343.

¹⁰²

<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/01371307544582795222257/p0000001.htm>, May 7, 2007.

¹⁰³ Antonio Jurado Aceituno, "Bir Filolog Olarak Dragoman," in *İspanya Türkiye: 16. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Rekabet ve Dostluk*, ed. Pablo Martín Asuero, trans. Peral Bayaz Çarum (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 223.

¹⁰⁴ Aceituno, 219.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

Gabriel de Aristizabal arrived at İstanbul along with the presents from Don Carlos III for the Ottoman Sultan.¹⁰⁶ Don Juan de Bouligny continued his mission but after the French assault on Egypt, he was accused of being a French collaborator as he was declared *persona non grata*. He was deported along with his Swedish and Dutch colleagues D'Ohhson and von Dedem in 1799.¹⁰⁷

As a result, the Spanish King, Don Carlos III initiated this peace process between the Ottoman and the Spanish Empires. He was eager to establish direct economic and political relations. From now on Spain could meet the Eastern Mediterranean without intermediaries, trade increased and thus the Spanish consulates started to open. The interaction between the Spanish and the Ottomans gradually increased.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, although the Spanish side had no desire for it, the Ottomans were successful in getting the Treaty of Neutrality with Spain which shows the ability of the Ottoman diplomacy in the late 18th century. Along with the Treaty of Friendship and Trade, the Treaty of Neutrality would be expected to serve the Ottoman needs in the critical period of 1780s since the Spanish Empire at least would not help the enemies of the Ottoman Empire, namely Austria and Russia. However, we should not forget that Spain was already in the Bourbon alliance and coordinated its foreign policy with France and the Two Sicilies. In addition to the political aspect of the treaty, Russia as an autocratic power did not look very sympathetic to relatively liberal Bourbons and that may have been an emotional aspect of the attitude of Don Carlos III.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Ottoman and Spanish Empires were the major world powers until the end of the 16th century, but they lost their aggressive interest towards each other due to the change in

¹⁰⁶ Eloy Martin Corrales, "İspanya-Osmanlı İlişkileri, 18. ve 19. Yüzyıllar," in *İspanya Türkiye: 16. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Rekabet ve Dostluk*, ed. Pablo Martin Asuero, trans. Peral Bayaz Çarum (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 236-237. For the Ottoman decrees on the acceptance of these ships into Turkish waters and the assistance see *İspanya Ahkam Defteri*, A.DVNS.DVE.d 047/2-0004 (order 7-8). The rest of the related decrees on the assistance to the Spanish vessels in the Mediterranean, and some other minor issues related to Bouligny's period of duty. For example some of his documents were stolen by bandits and the Ottoman capital alarmed the governors of Rumeli, see *İspanya Ahkam Defteri*, A.DVNS.DVE.d 047/2-0004 (order 9).

¹⁰⁷ Beydilli, "İspanya", 168.

¹⁰⁸ Corrales, 236-239.

their political and economic targets at that period. In the 17th and 18th centuries, they were longer able to play primary roles in the international arena since their positions were challenged by new rivals. In the late 18th century, the Ottomans and the Spanish understood that the relations have to be re-established because of the needs of diplomacy. It is also true that the Ottomans did not make any attempt to normalize their relations with Spain but the Bourbon monarch Don Carlos III initiated the peace-process for mainly commercial reasons and of course to avoid the attacks of gazis in North Africa. Why were the Ottomans reluctant to make peace with Spain? According to Cevdet Paşa, they could not truly understand the importance of trade. However, it is quite reasonable for the Ottomans to expect political benefits from such a re-approachment because the late 18th century was a period of disasters for them and they would welcome any help. The alliance with the Spanish Empire, as I emphasized, could serve the Ottoman needs like the control of Gibraltar. That is why, the Ottoman side successfully insisted on the political terms along with the Treaty of Trade and Friendship which was finally signed on September 14, 1782 thanks to the efforts of the Ottoman statesmen and of course the Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Boulogny.

We can not be sure if there was an Ottoman policy of re-approachment with Spain before the late 18th century, but we may understand the logic behind this agreement. The alliance between the Russians and the Austrians realized the worst nightmares of the Ottomans. Thus, they had to balance this enemy coalition with new friends and allies. We can not know if the Ottomans had a strategic plan of forming a unified front. However, we may see the results of the Ottoman diplomacy. There were three pillars of the Ottoman diplomacy to curb the Russian as well as Austrian aggressions. The first pillar was unexpectedly formed by the Spanish Empire when Carlos III sent his envoy to the Ottoman capital for a simple capitulation. The Ottomans managed to get the Treaty of Neutrality with Spain in 1782. The second pillar was going to be the traditional Swedish alliance due to their hostility with the Russians and the second Treaty of Alliance with Sweden was signed in 1789. The third pillar was an important success for the Ottoman diplomacy. The Prussians were convinced to sign an alliance for both against the Austrians and the Russians. Thus, The Treaty of Alliance with Prussia was signed in 1790.

As a result, the Ottomans and the Spanish Empires, the Great Powers of once, lost their status as the primary actors at the same time. They were no longer the well respected and glorious empires of the 16th century. They could not follow the technological

and financial advance of the North European states and they were accused of being culturally unable to advance in terms of the capitalist development. The Ottoman and the Spanish at least came together in 1782 but then it was too late for developing a solid base of relations. Soon the French Revolution shook the thrones of the monarchs, while the Ottoman Empire was dealing with the Ottoman-Austrian and the Ottoman-Russian Wars (1787-1792). Furthermore, both the Ottoman and Spanish Empires would face aggression from the Napoléonic France in the beginning of the 19th century. The invasions of Napoléon also carried the new ideas of nationalism which was mortal for the empires. On the other hand, although their vast empires vanished, the Turks and the Spanish are still living same Mediterranean culture and thus they are closer than ever.

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